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Abstract. We study games with natural-language labels (i.e., strategic problems where options are 
denoted by words), for which we propose and test a measurable characterization of prominence. We 
assume that – ceteris paribus – players find particularly prominent those strategies that are denoted by 
words more frequently used in their everyday language. To operationalize this assumption, we suggest 
that the prominence of a strategy-label is correlated with its frequency of occurrence in large text corpora, 
such as the Google Books corpus (“n-gram” frequency). In testing for the strategic use of word frequency, 
we consider experimental games with different incentive structures (such as incentives to and not to 
coordinate), as well as subjects from different cultural/linguistic backgrounds. Our data show that 
frequently-mentioned labels are more (less) likely to be selected when there are incentives to match 
(mismatch) others. Furthermore, varying one’s knowledge of the others’ country of residence 
significantly affects one’s reliance on word frequency. Overall, the data show that individuals play 
strategies that fulfill our characterization of prominence in a (boundedly) rational manner. 
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I - Introduction 
Coordination problems can affect a broad array of economic interactions, yet they are 
often solved by shared cultural understandings. Culture is in fact believed to facilitate 
coordination by informally codifying the common beliefs and practices that are shared by a 
society’s members (Alesina and Giuliano, 2015).  For example, global companies that wish to 
match potential demand in developing markets usually adjust their strategies in such a way to 
connect to (and hence coordinate with) culturally diverse consumers. In that case, cultural 
awareness affects an organization’s marketing activities – from labeling to customer services – 
thereby making some products more salient for some consumer segments (Kapferer, 2012).  
More generally, it has been suggested that cultural and sociolinguistic competence favor the 
coordination of economic interactions by promoting trade, development, and growth (Easterly 
and Levine, 1997; Lazear, 1999; Melitz, 2008).  Natural languages are indeed an instance of a 
cultural code that eases the exchange of information and hence facilitates economic activities 
(Ginsburgh and Weber, 2020).1 
Thomas Schelling (1960) was the first to note that a wide range of economic interactions 
can be formally represented as a “coordination problem”, that is, a symmetric simultaneous-
move game with multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibria.2  Schelling informally observed that 
coordination puzzles are often solved by exploiting contextual or cultural cues, that drive 
expectations in such a way to make a specific course of action salient in specific circumstances. 
As we will elaborate below, more recent explanations of prominence (i.e., salience) have 
centered around features of the game that players perceive as distinctive, where such distinctive 
 
1 Research in political economy has shown that countries’ per-capita GDP growth is inversely related to their ethno-
linguistic fractionalization (Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg, 2003).  Also, it has been 
suggested that production line workers coordinate tasks more efficiently if they speak the same language, although 
this might result in a form of labor market discrimination against cultural minorities (Lang, 1986; Kossoudji, 1988). 
2 The class of coordination problems contains any situation in which there are multiple ways agents may “match” 
their behavior for mutual benefit.  This class contains a vast and diverse array of interactions, including games with 
(slightly) conflicting interests, with and without Pareto-rankable equilibria.  Specifically, interactions where players 
wish to coordinate – but have conflicting interests – are sometimes referred to as impure coordination games (e.g., 
Luce and Raiffa’s, 1957, battle of the sexes is a classic example).  Bacharach’s (2006) Hi-Lo game is an instance of 
a conflict-free problem with two equilibria, one of which is Pareto-dominated by the other. On the other hand, 
Schelling’s (1960) driving game is a case where each player is completely indifferent between the equilibria. See 
Lewis (1969) for an early book-length account of coordination games. 
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features do not necessarily vary across cultures.3  Here, on the other hand, we propose and test a 
characterization of prominence that directly rests on players’ culture. 
To that end, we note that advances in online data collection and processing have made it 
possible for researchers to access (culture-dependent) digitized information at little cost. These 
advances have boosted the use of “big data” to investigate economic, psychological, and medical 
outcomes (e.g., Varian, 2014; Einav and Levin, 2014; Matz and Netzer, 2017; Yin, Sulieman, 
and Malin, 2019).  In particular, recent developments have facilitated the extraction of 
information from online text documents, which has made it possible to track language use across 
different cultures and over long periods of time (Michel et al., 2011).  Such developments have 
led us to propose the following notion of prominence for “games with natural-language labels” 
(i.e., strategic problems where options are denoted by words). 
In a nutshell, we assume that players find particularly prominent those strategies that are 
denoted by words more frequently used in the players’ everyday language, ceteris paribus.  
Specifically, to operationalize this assumption we suggest that the prominence of a strategy-label 
is correlated with its frequency of occurrence in large text corpora, like the Google Books corpus 
(“n-gram” frequency).4  In testing for the strategic use of word frequency, we consider 
experimental games with different incentive structures (such as incentives to and not to 
coordinate), participants from different cultural backgrounds, as well as participants with 
asymmetric knowledge about the counterpart’s cultural background. 
Before fleshing out our hypotheses and methods, we note that formal (game-theoretic) 
characterizations of prominence have typically revolved around features of the strategic problem, 
that would drive one’s perception as to the uniqueness of a solution independently of one’s 
culture.  For example, Harsanyi and Selten’s (1988) payoff-dominance criterion assumes that any 
rational player (upon facing a one-shot game with no pre-play communication) would discard 
solutions that are collectively suboptimal: in that case, the payoff structure of the game serves as 
a “cue”, thereby directing players’ expectations toward the collectively optimal solution.  Related 
characterizations of prominence have integrated the payoff-dominance criterion into a theory of 
 
3 For example, Bacharach and Bernasconi (1997) noted that players solve coordination games by exploiting 
distinctive attributes of the strategy space. The authors went on to note that – in the class of games where strategy 
options are represented by visual objects – there «are attributes, such as colors, comparative sizes, and simple 
geometric shapes, whose saliencies are universal constants [...]. But for others, saliencies are culture-dependent» 
(Bacharach and Bernasconi, 1997, p. 7, our italics). 
4 This is a standard metric for word frequency in languages, and has so far been used for psychological, sociological, 
and historical research (e.g., Hills, Proto, Sgroi, and Seresinhe, 2019; Garg, Schiebinger, Jurafsky, and Zou, 2018). 
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framing, whereby players select the collectively optimal solution to some perceptual description 
of the game.5  In this respect, lab experiments have provided evidence confirming that payoff and 
frame asymmetries do – each to a different extent – affect behavior. That is, experiments have 
shown that if one of the game solutions is an “oddity” (in the sense that its label or payoff profile 
differ from the others), then the distinctiveness of that solution serves as a cue to facilitate 
coordination (e.g., Bacharach and Bernasconi, 1997; Rubinstein, Tversky, and Heller, 1997; 
Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich, 2008).  In summary, per the above explanations of 
prominence, a solution is generally viewed as a “focal point” by virtue of culture-invariant cues.  
In what follows, instead, we explicitly study culture’s role in affecting behavior by introducing 
an a-priori measurable proxy for prominence (i.e., word frequency). 
Our approach rests on a psychologically grounded characterization of focality, that has 
important implications for our understanding of strategic reasoning.  Research in cognitive 
psychology has shown that the frequency of exposure to words is closely related to word fluency, 
that is, the ease with which an individual is able to recognize, retrieve, and process a word.  
Word frequency – through its effect on fluency – has been shown to have a role in a wide range 
of memory and language tasks (e.g., Anderson and Schooler, 1991; Balota and Spieler, 1999; 
Jescheniak and Levelt, 1994; Morrison and Ellis, 1995; Seidenberg and McClelland, 1989). 
Notably, there is evidence that individuals use word frequency as a cue in several non-strategic 
domains, like probability judgment (e.g., Dougherty, Franco-Watkins, and Thomas, 2008; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), risk perception (Hertwig, Pachur, and Kurzenhäuser, 2005; 
Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman, and Combs, 1978), as well as factual judgment 
(Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996; Hertwig, Herzog, Schooler, and Reimer, 2008).  In all these 
domains, the frequency of occurrence of a word in everyday language is positively correlated 
with the tendency to select that word as a response, and to evaluate the object denoted by that 
word as being large, important, truthful, or desirable.  Indeed, fluency is believed to be one of the 
 
5 Frame-based theories of coordination are sometimes divided into two broad classes, namely, team reasoning and 
level-k models.  Theories of team reasoning assume that a group member follows the decision rule/frame that, if 
followed by other members, would be optimal for each of them (e.g., Crawford and Haller, 1990; Bacharach, 1993; 
Sugden, 1995; Casajus, 2000; Blume, 2000; Janssen, 2001; Alós-Ferrer and Kuzmics, 2013).  By contrast, level-k 
theories assume a hierarchy of cognitive levels, whereby higher types best respond to lower-level players, anchoring 
their beliefs in the behavior of strategically naïve individuals (see Bacharach and Stahl, 2000, for a frame-based 
model of level-k reasoning).  Relatedly, Charness and Sontuoso (2019) take a hybrid approach such that team 
reasoning is reduced to the case where one believes others play like oneself, given one’s partial awareness of frames. 
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mechanisms through which the availability heuristic operates (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; 
Schwarz, Bless, Strack, Klumpp, Rittenauer-Schatka, and Simons, 1991). 
The non-strategic literature above caused us to speculate that word frequency could be 
used as a proxy for prominence in strategic domains. For example, consider a pure coordination 
game where the strategy set is given by {paprika, curry, chili}.6  In this case, the strategy-label 
that is most frequently mentioned in everyday language may be most “fluent” (easy to process). 
Hence subjects could be drawn to that option, in the same way as they are drawn to fluent 
options in the non-strategic literature above.  Yet – unlike the psychological literature – this 
paper aims to verify whether subjects strategically exploit word frequency.  Here, one might 
argue that if there is common reason to believe that an option easily comes to mind to people 
with the same cultural background, then it may be optimal to select that option in pure 
coordination games.7  But what about games with unaligned incentives?  And what about players 
with different cultural/linguistic backgrounds?  To address these questions and test for the 
strategic use of word frequency, we propose the following three studies. 
We designed Study 1 as a preliminary test for predicting behavior in 2-player (one-shot) 
pure coordination games with a finite set of strategies (played by culturally alike participants). A 
few points are worth noting.  First, our strategy options present no payoff asymmetries; in fact, 
note that we only consider games without Pareto-rankable equilibria, which allows us to rule out 
a common driver of prominence as an explanation for our data patterns.8  Second, we designed 
each game by randomly drawing labels from lists of words in the same semantic domain (e.g., 
names of food ingredients): this means that our games have no obvious frame asymmetries, and 
hence we can rule out another common driver of prominence.9  Having found a strong 
correlation between word frequency (i.e., n-gram frequency computed in the general English 
 
6 Pure coordination games are characterized by the following payoff structure:  if players select the same strategy, 
they each receive an identical positive payoff (say, 1 currency unit); otherwise, they each receive nothing. 
7 One mechanism supporting such a hypothesis (about the strategic use of word frequency) is that subjects may 
realize that their counterpart might be culturally alike and hence view the problem in a similar way. For evidence on 
“projection”, see Hedden and Zhang (2002), Sebanz, Knoblich, and Prinz (2003), and Rubinstein and Salant (2016). 
8 For early evidence on coordination games with Pareto-rankable equilibria, see Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross 
(1990); for the case of repeated games, see also Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1990).  For more recent experiments 
with Pareto-rankable equilibria, see Bardsley and Ule (2017) and Faillo, Smerilli, and Sugden (2017). 
9 Recent experiments with more or less obvious frame asymmetries include, among others: Blume and Gneezy 
(2010); Bardsley, Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden (2010); Hargreaves Heap, Rojo Arjona, and Sugden (2014, 2017). Of 
particular interest is Hargreaves Heap et al.’s (2017) design, which elicits subjects’ beliefs about alternative 
heuristics that may drive behavior in coordination games. (Note that, unlike our studies, their design does not 
involve an a-priori measurable proxy for prominence, nor does it vary subjects’ incentives or cultural background.) 
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Google Books corpus) and behavior in coordination games, we designed two more studies to put 
to test our notion of prominence under different conditions. 
Study 2 contrasts choice behavior in (i) a pure coordination game, against the behavior of 
participants in three alternative roles/conditions (with each condition featuring exactly the same 
list of labels).  More specifically, we consider:  (ii) the case in which a subject is prompted to 
pick an option, without any explicit objective;  (iii) the case where a subject is prompted to avoid 
matching her counterpart’s choice, under the assumption that her counterpart instead wants to 
match (i.e., the role of Hider in a Hide-and-Seek game);  (iv) the case where a subject is 
prompted to match her counterpart’s choice, under the assumption that her counterpart instead 
wants to avoid any such match (i.e., the role of Seeker in a Hide-and-Seek game).  Since all our 
conditions involve the exact same options, note that if the effect of word frequency were merely 
due to an automatic (or naïve) response, then we should observe similar choice distributions 
across the four conditions.  However, the data paint a different picture.  Participants in problem ii 
(i.e., “Pickers”) were about as likely to select the most frequently-mentioned label as were 
participants in problem i (i.e., “Coordinators”).  On the other hand, Hiders were less likely to 
select the most frequently-mentioned label than Seekers and, in turn, Seekers were less likely 
than Coordinators.  As shall be discussed, this pattern indicates a boundedly rational, strategic 
use of word frequency that is consistent with a particular specification of level-k reasoning 
(Nagel, 1995; Stahl and Wilson, 1995; Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta, 2001). 
We designed Study 3 to delve further into the strategic use of word frequency in pure 
coordination games. To that end, each of the games of Study 3 involves labels that we purposely 
selected so that the option with the highest word frequency differs between the American- and 
British-English vocabularies (as measured by the n-gram frequency in the American- and 
British-English Google Books corpora, respectively).10  We then varied the cultural/linguistic 
makeup of the subject pool by recruiting individuals residing in either the US or the UK; 
additionally, we manipulated our subjects’ knowledge of the counterpart’s country of residence.  
Consistent with our predictions, the data show that choice behavior differs between US and UK 
subjects and, in each case, it is positively related to the word frequency of the strategy-labels in 
the relevant vocabulary. Moreover, the data show that subjects are less likely to rely on word 
 
10 For example, consider the game with strategy set {paprika, curry, chili}. There, “curry” has the highest n-gram 
frequency in British English and the lowest one in American English; conversely, “chili” has the highest n-gram 
frequency in American English and the lowest one in British English. 
 6 
frequency as a means to guiding their behavior if they know that their counterpart resides in a 
different country. Put differently, if subjects are aware that their assigned partner is alike (in 
terms of cultural background), then they are more likely to select the label most frequently 
mentioned in their vocabulary. 
We finally compared coordination rates that would be obtained if different subsamples 
were paired with each other, using Monte Carlo methods.  In brief, successful coordination is 
more likely when subjects were knowingly paired with partners from their own country, as 
opposed to when they were knowingly or unknowingly paired with partners from a different 
country.  Notably, subjects who were knowingly paired with partners from the same country 
exhibit expected coordination rates between 10 and 20 percentage points higher than chance. 
To conclude, for the first time we propose and test an a-priori measurable proxy for 
prominence that explicitly rests on players’ culture.  Our experiments provide very robust 
evidence indicating that individuals play strategies fulfilling our notion of prominence in a 
(boundedly) rational manner.  Remarkably, reliance on word frequency leads to higher rates of 
coordination than chance, and more so when individuals knowingly share a cultural background.  
The remainder of the article is organized in this manner: section II lays out the experimental 
procedures, sections III-V present our studies, and section VI concludes. 
 
II - General Procedures 
Our studies were conducted online between September and November 2016. A primary 
motivation for running online experiments is the ease with which the experimenter can control 
the cultural makeup of the subject pool. Another advantage is the ease with which the 
experimenter can vary subjects’ knowledge of the fellow participants’ cultural characteristics: 
this makes online experimentation optimal for testing culture-related hypotheses. (For a 
methodological discussion of extra-laboratory experiments, we refer the reader to Charness, 
Gneezy, and Kuhn, 2013.) 
Participants were recruited through Prolific Academic, a crowdsourcing platform backed 
by Oxford University Innovation (https://www.prolific.co/). Participation in our study was 
limited to individuals with a Prolific Academic approval rate greater than 95%.  At the beginning 
of each study, subjects were informed that they would be paired with a fellow participant at 
random, and that they would not know the identity of their counterpart or be able to 
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communicate with them.  Participants’ responses were incentivized, as specified in the following 
sections.  No subject was allowed to participate in more than one study. 
As a proxy for the prominence of strategy-labels, we used the case-insensitive average 
yearly n-gram frequency (henceforth simply NGRAM) of the corresponding words in the Google 
Books corpus, for books published after 2000.  NGRAM values represent the fraction of times in 
which phrases (in our case, words) occur in the corpus of interest; for Studies 1, 2 we used the 
general English corpus, whereas for Study 3 we used the American-English and British-English 
corpora.  The values were obtained through the Google n-gram tool in August 2016, shortly 
before running the studies (https://books.google.com/ngrams/info).  Note that n-gram frequencies 
are a reliable, standard metric for word popularity in corpus linguistics (Michel et al., 2011; 
Garg, Schiebinger, Jurafsky, and Zou, 2018; Hills, Proto, Sgroi, and Seresinhe, 2019). 
 
III - Study 1 
Demographics. The subject pool for Study 1 consisted of 91 US resident individuals. The 
average participant was 33 years old, and 57% of the subjects were male. Participants took less 
than 10 minutes to review the instructions and complete all the tasks; they received a 0.5 GBP 
participation fee (in addition to the payoffs earned in each game), which is on par with typical 
wages on Prolific Academic or other Internet marketplaces such as MTurk. 
 
Design. We designed Study 1 as a preliminary test for predicting behavior in 2-player pure 
coordination games.  This study involves a series of (one-shot) games, with each game featuring 
a 3-element strategy set, such that: each member of a pair receives GBP 0.10 if both players 
choose the same option; each member of a pair receives nothing otherwise.  Figure 1 represents 
the game structure in bimatrix form (there, for expositional purposes the set of strategies is 
denoted by {X, Y, Z}; note that subjects were not provided any such figure).  Subjects played 10 
instances of the game, with each instance differing from the others only in the names of the three 
options. Each subject was assigned the same partner for all the (10) games. No feedback was 
provided between games. 
We ran two versions of the study: Version A’s options consist of names of countries, 
whereas Version B’s options consist of names of food ingredients; both versions are shown in 
Table 1 below.  The reason we designed two versions is to verify that the (presumed) 
prominence of frequently-mentioned labels does not depend on the characteristics of a specific 
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collection.  Note that the option sets for Version A were obtained by drawing member states of 
the United Nations at random.  The option sets for Version B were obtained by drawing words at 
random from a list of ingredients scraped off the Epicurious cooking website 
(https://www.epicurious.com/).11 
  
Player 2 
  
X Y Z 
Player 1 
X 
0.10 
 
 
0.10 
0 
 
 
0 
0 
 
 
0 
Y 
0 
 
 
0 
0.10 
 
 
0.10 
0 
 
 
0 
Z 
0 
 
 
0 
0 
 
 
0 
0.10 
 
 
0.10 
Figure 1 - The coordination game.  The bottom-left and top-right numbers in each cell represent the 
monetary payoffs to Player 1 and Player 2, respectively.  (For expositional purposes, the set of strategies 
is denoted by {X, Y, Z}; subjects were not provided any such figure.) 
 
Participants were randomly assigned to the two versions: 48 subjects were assigned to 
Version A, and 43 subjects to Version B.12  Average earnings were GBP 0.63 and 0.52 for 
Version A and B, respectively (not including subjects’ participation fees).  Before presenting the 
experimental results, we shall note that the order of the games was randomized across subjects.  
By contrast, the order of the three options – in a given game – was determined prior to the 
experiment at random, and was identical across subjects.  More precisely, in each game the 
strategy-labels were arranged in a column, with options X, Y, and Z of Table 1 below being 
respectively displayed at the top, center, and bottom of the list.  For the experimental instructions 
and screenshots, see Appendix B. 
 
 
 
11 It is worth clarifying a general point in relation to our option sets. It is possible that – around the time our study 
was conducted – some options in our lists were being mentioned in the news or social media more often than usual, 
a fact that would not be immediately accounted for by the n-gram frequency at the time. Nevertheless, we believe 
that our randomized selection of labels overall controls for any such “random shocks”. 
12 Given the odd number of subjects in Version B, one participant was assigned two partners (but received 
compensation for playing with either one, at random); the two partners were treated like any other participant. 
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Version A Version B 
 [option X] [option Y] [option Z]  [option X] [option Y] [option Z] 
1 Kyrgyzstan Tuvalu Morocco 1 mandarin soybean cinnamon 
 .4435 .1139 2.4424 (h)  .7727 .8652 1.3619 (h) 
2 Turkey Jamaica Senegal 2 raspberry sauerkraut scallion 
 2.1062 (h) .6537 .2399  2.0997 (h) .6453 .2549 
3 Yemen Benin Jamaica 3 cashew vanilla yogurt 
 .6588 .4876 1.8535 (h)  .2170 1.5978 (h) 1.1850 
4 Spain Angola Norway 4 meat cocoa raspberry 
 2.2128 (h) .1943 .5927  2.5905 (h) .3052 .1041 
5 Bolivia Kyrgyzstan Palau 5 horseradish rhubarb tarragon 
 2.1420 (h) .5533 .3046  1.0992 1.1067 (h) .7940 
6 Afghanistan Germany Ghana 6 butter peppermint cocoa 
 .3663 2.4533 (h) .1802  2.3233 (h) .1339 .5426 
7 Nepal Uzbekistan Thailand 7 pineapple nutmeg buckwheat 
 .9101 .3106 1.7791 (h)  1.6064 (h) .9394 .4540 
8 Bahamas Botswana Tuvalu 8 apple milk tuna 
 1.1349 1.7162 (h) .1487  .9075 1.9335 (h) .1588 
9 Bahamas Eritrea Ghana 9 buckwheat tomato citrus 
 .6005 .4705 1.9289 (h)  .1740 1.9814 (h) .8445 
10 Ukraine Jordan Zambia 10 brandy pumpkin tomato 
 .7379 1.9148 (h) .3472  .9506 .5337 1.5156 (h) 
Table 1 - The option sets for Study 1.  The left and right panels refer to Version A and B, respectively. 
Below each strategy-label is the relative n-gram frequency of that label, computed from the general 
English corpus including books published after the year 2000. Note: for each option, the reported number 
is obtained by dividing the NGRAM value of its label by the mean of the values of the three labels in the 
game (to normalize the data, simply divide each value by 3).  For visual clarity, the option with the 
relatively highest NGRAM value is marked with an “h”. 
 
Results. The average participant in Study 1 chose the strategy associated with the highest, 
middling and lowest NGRAM value respectively 45.27%, 39.34% and 15.39% of the time 
(specifically, subjects selected the option with the highest NGRAM 45.83% of the time in 
Version A, and 44.65% of the time in Version B on average; for a bar graph of the distributions 
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of individual-level choices in each of the games, see Appendix A).  These data patterns are 
clearly suggestive of a positive impact of the labels’ n-gram frequency on strategic play.13  The 
following tests provide extensive evidence in support of the strategic use of word frequency, 
while addressing a potential confound. 
One may argue that labels that are displayed in a particular position might be perceived 
as more salient by some subjects. Thus, we now verify that the impact of word frequency is not 
confounded by the position of a label on the screen (i.e., top, center, or bottom of the list).  To do 
so, we shall compute the frequency with which a subject chooses the n-th position, in games 
where the n-th label does and does not have the highest NGRAM value. 
We start by considering the label displayed first (i.e., at the top of the list). This exercise 
reveals that when the top label has the highest NGRAM value, it is chosen 55.03% of the time on 
average; by contrast, the top label is chosen 45.36% of the time whenever it does not have the 
highest NGRAM value. A two-tailed Wilcoxon sign-ranked test shows that the difference is 
strongly significant (N = 91 obs., z = 3.042, p = 0.002).14  Performing the same analysis with 
respect to the other positions corroborates the trend.  In fact, when the center label has the 
highest NGRAM value it is chosen 36.44% of the time, compared with 21.08% whenever it does 
not have the highest value (N = 91 obs., z = 5.305, p = 0.000).  Furthermore, when the bottom 
label has the highest NGRAM value it is chosen 43.40% of the time, compared with 15.75% 
whenever it does not have the highest value (N = 91 obs., z = 6.421, p = 0.000).  In summary, the 
n-th strategy option is chosen significantly more often when its label has the highest NGRAM 
value, compared with when it does not have the highest value. 
Moving on, we note that since the three options (in any of our games) constitute 
symmetric strategies, here Harsanyi and Selten (1988) would argue that the rational solution is to 
play a “symmetry-invariant” equilibrium, assigning each option the same probability. In their 
 
13 Interestingly, these summary data are comparable to the behavioral patterns observed in games where one of the 
strategies is devised by the experimenter as the obvious “odd-one-out”.  For example, Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden 
(1994) designed four coordination games where the strategy options are represented by visual objects (i.e., questions 
no. 17-20, p. 669).  In two of those games the odd-one-out was chosen by 44.4% of participants, whereas in the 
other two games it was chosen by about 64% of participants; in this regard, note that the Mehta et al. (1994) games 
feature a 15-element strategy set, which renders the odd-one-out more prominent (recognizably different) than it 
would have been in a 3-element strategy set such as ours. 
14 The test uses one observation per subject, consisting of the difference between the two above-described rates (i.e., 
the frequency with which a subject plays top, in games where the top label has the highest NGRAM value and in 
games where the top label does not have the highest value).  Note that the Wilcoxon sign-ranked test is the non-
parametric analog to the paired samples t-test. 
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view, such a solution has the benefit of being unique and it ensures that a renaming of the 
strategies cannot ever affect game play (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988, pp. 70-74.)  In this case, 
their proposed solution is not supported by the data, as our choice distribution significantly 
differs from the fully mixed equilibrium strategy profile that assigns equal probability to each 
strategy (N = 91 obs., 𝑇𝑇2 = 127.67, p = 0.000 under a Hotelling’s T-squared generalized means 
test, conducted on the sample of per-subject mean choices; note that the Hotelling’s test is simply 
a multivariate generalization of the t-test).15  Relatedly, we stress that the fully mixed 
equilibrium implies a coordination rate of 0.33, whereas the expected coordination rate resulting 
from our sample is roughly 0.50 on average (specifically, 0.57 for Version A and 0.49 for 
Version B; this means that the payoffs earned by participants in Version A and B are respectively 
72% and 48% higher than the payoffs subjects would earn by coordinating on the fully mixed 
equilibrium).16,17 
In concluding, we note that we designed Study 1 as a preliminary test for predicting 
behavior in coordination games. The method of analysis employed so far has involved mean 
observations, thereby discarding a fair amount of information. To shed light on the strategic use 
of word frequency, below we consider some between-subjects designs; we then perform a more 
sophisticated analysis in such a way to account for the characteristics of each triplet of labels. 
 
IV - Study 2 
Demographics. The subject pool for Study 2 consisted of 160 US resident individuals. The 
average participant was 30 years old, and 58% of the subjects were male. As with Study 1, 
participants took less than 10 minutes to review the instructions and complete all the tasks; they 
received a 0.5 GBP participation fee, in addition to the payoffs earned in each game (if any), as 
specified below. 
 
15 The sample of (per-subject) mean observations is obtained as follows.  First, for each choice of subject 𝑖𝑖, assign a 
value of 1 or 0 to indicate if the option with the highest NGRAM was chosen or not; then, take the average across all 
the games played by subject 𝑖𝑖. Similarly, assign a value of 1 or 0 to indicate if the option with the middling NGRAM 
was chosen or not, and take the average across games. The same applies to the option with the lowest NGRAM. 
16 In keeping with previous studies, we report expected coordination rates (as opposed to actual frequencies of 
coordination; see for example Mehta et al., 1994, and Crawford et al., 2008).  In fact, actual frequencies of 
coordination are affected by the eventual pairing of partners, thereby resulting in a biased metric in smaller samples. 
17 The expected coordination rate gives the probability that two randomly drawn subjects choose the same strategy 
in a randomly selected game. For each version of Study 1, we calculate this rate using Monte Carlo methods. The 
pseudo code is as follows: (A) pick two participants at random; (B) pick one of the 10 games at random; (C) if both 
participants chose the same strategy consider it an instance of successful coordination, otherwise consider it 
unsuccessful; (D) repeat steps A-C 100,000 times, then calculate the relative frequency of successful coordination. 
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Design. The objective of the study is to test for the strategic use of word frequency by 
systematically varying players’ incentives.  To that end, we designed a few variants of the simple 
coordination game of Study 1, in such a way to incentivize or disincentivize coordination for 
either player.  In order to check for replicability, Study 2 features the exact same option triplets 
as in Version A of Study 1 (see the left panel of Table 1 above).18  That being said, Study 2 
involves the following four roles/conditions. 
a. Coordinate: This is a replication of Version A of Study 1 that, among other purposes, 
serves to verify the robustness of our earlier results. Participants in this condition 
(“Coordinators”) were paired with other participants in the same condition, and were so 
informed. 
b. Pick: Participants in this condition (“Pickers”) were presented with the same labels as in 
the Coordinate condition, except that they were asked to merely pick one of the three 
given options. That is, participants were not assigned a partner, nor did they receive any 
additional payoffs on the basis of their choices; hence, they had no strategic incentive to 
select one label over another. 
c.  Seek: This condition features the same strategy-labels as in the Coordinate condition, 
except that the incentive structure reflects the role of “Seeker” in the Hide-and-Seek 
game—Figure 2 below represents the payoff structure of this game. As can be seen there, 
a Seeker receives GBP 0.10 if both members of a pair choose the same strategy, and 
nothing otherwise. Participants in this condition were paired with participants in the Hide 
condition below, and were so informed. 
d. Hide: Again, this condition features the same strategy-labels as in the Coordinate 
condition, but the incentive structure reflects the role of “Hider” in the Hide-and-Seek 
game. As can be seen in Figure 2, a Hider receives GBP 0.10 if members of a pair choose 
different strategies, and nothing otherwise. Participants in this condition were paired with 
participants in the Seek condition above, and were so informed. 
Each subject completed 10 tasks in the same role/condition, with each task differing from the 
others only in the names of the three options (see the left panel of Table 1 above). In the 
Coordinate, Seek, and Hide conditions each subject was assigned the same partner for all the 
(10) games, and was so informed.19  No feedback was provided between games. 
 
18 Note that here we focused on Version A – i.e., names of countries – simply to be economical; in Study 3 below 
we will resume investigating the impact of word frequency in the context of food ingredients. 
19 Given that in the Hide condition there were less participants than in the Seek condition, (for the mere purpose of 
calculating the payoffs of the extra Seekers) nine Hiders were matched with two Seekers, but received compensation 
for playing with either one at random. 
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Before discussing our predictions, we note that (as with Study 1) the order of the 
tasks/games was randomized across subjects.  On the other hand, the order of the three options – 
in a given task – was determined prior to the experiment at random, and was identical across 
subjects. Specifically, the order of the three options was the same as in Study 1; i.e., the labels 
were arranged in a column, with options X, Y, and Z of Table 1 (left panel) being respectively 
displayed at the top, center, and bottom of the list.  For the experimental instructions and 
screenshots, see Appendix B. 
  
Seeker 
  
X Y Z 
Hider 
X 
0.10 
 
 
0 
0 
 
 
0.10 
0 
 
 
0.10 
Y 
0 
 
 
0.10 
0.10 
 
 
0 
0 
 
 
0.10 
Z 
0 
 
 
0.10 
0 
 
 
0.10 
0.10 
 
 
0 
Figure 2 - The Hide-and-Seek game structure in bimatrix form.  The bottom-left and top-right numbers in 
each cell represent the monetary payoffs to the Hider and Seeker, respectively. 
  
Since all our conditions involve the exact same labels, if the effect of word frequency 
were merely due to an automatic (or naïve) response, then we should observe similar choice 
distributions across conditions.  If instead participants used word frequency in a strategic 
manner, then frequently-mentioned labels should be more (less) likely selected when there are 
incentives to match (mismatch) others, with the magnitude of the changes varying with subjects’ 
strategic sophistication.  Below we model our intuition with a particular specification of level-k 
reasoning (Nagel, 1995; Stahl and Wilson, 1995; Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta, 2001; 
Camerer, Ho, and Chong, 2004; Costa-Gomes and Crawford, 2006). 
Level-k theories posit a hierarchy of player types defined by the level of sophistication 
with which each player reasons.  Specifically, level-k types anchor their beliefs in a non-strategic 
L0 type and adjust them via iterated best responses, so that L1 players best respond to L0 players, 
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L2 best respond to L1, and so on.20  In what follows, we implement this approach by formulating 
a set of assumptions that are relevant for our setting; this exercise will formally generate our 
predictions.  In short, we shall assume that: 
(i) A non-strategic L0 type in the Coordinate, Seek, or Hide conditions behaves like a 
participant in the Pick condition; 
(ii) Players at levels above L0 believe that the distribution 𝑞𝑞 of L0 choices has a peak 
at the option with the highest NGRAM value; 
(iii) There are no players at L3 or higher. 
A few comments are in order.  We note that level-k theories commonly assume that L0 types do 
not engage in strategic reasoning, but simply randomize between options according to some 
probability distribution 𝑞𝑞. In particular, Crawford and Iriberri (2007) assume that such a 
distribution is non-uniform – positing that L0 types are relatively more likely to select salient 
labels, compared with other labels – without however defining “salience” in general terms. 
For the purposes of generating hypotheses, we partly sidestep the issue of specifying the 
probability distribution 𝑞𝑞 by defining it empirically (on the basis of Pickers’ behavior), as per 
assumption (i).  Then, since our subjects obviously do not observe that distribution, we posit that 
players at levels above L0 believe that “L0 types are more likely to select the option with the 
highest NGRAM than to select any other option”, as per assumption (ii).  Lastly, we note that 
(iii) is a simplifying assumption, based on previous empirical evidence about subjects’ strategic 
sophistication. For example, Arad and Rubinstein (2012) observe that level-k experiments have 
shown that «the most frequent types are usually L1 and L2, whereas higher-level types are rare» 
(p. 3561). For a similar point, see also Penczynski’s (2016) analysis of Hide-and-Seek games. 
What does the above entail in terms of behavioral predictions? As usual, L1 types will 
best respond to (their beliefs about) L0 behavior; L2 types will accordingly adjust their beliefs, 
and best respond to L1 types.  Specifically, L1 Coordinators will best respond to their beliefs 
about L0 behavior (which in our case are defined by assumption ii), and therefore will select the 
option with the highest NGRAM with probability one. Then, L2 Coordinators will best respond 
 
20 Note that some applications of level-k reasoning differ in their assumptions as to whether there are actually any 
players at L0 (as will be clear, such assumptions do not qualitatively affect our predictions).  Applications further 
differ in their assumptions as to the players’ randomizing behavior at L0.  Another element in regard to which 
models differ is the players’ depth of reasoning about other types; in particular, some models assume that players at 
each level above L0 best respond to a probability mix of the decisions of all levels below their own, as opposed to 
best responding to the one level immediately below. For discussion, see Crawford, Costa-Gomes, and Iriberri (2013) 
and Mauersberger and Nagel (2018). 
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to L1 Coordinators, thereby selecting the option with the highest NGRAM (with probability 
one).  Moving on, we note that Seekers wish to select the label believed to be the modal choice 
of Hiders at the level below, whereas Hiders wish to avoid the label believed to be the modal 
choice of Seekers at the level below: here, this implies that the option with the highest NGRAM 
will be respectively selected by L1 Hiders and L1 Seekers with probability zero and one; hence, 
the option with the highest NGRAM will be selected by both L2 Hiders and L2 Seekers with 
probability zero. 
In summary, the experiment aims to verify if subjects’ behavior is compatible with a 
strategic use of word frequency. If it were not, we should observe the same choice distributions 
across roles/conditions. If instead subjects used word frequency in a (boundedly) rational 
manner, then – based on the assumptions above – behavior should vary across roles as follows. 
H1: Coordinators select the most frequently-mentioned label as often as (or more often than) 
Pickers. 
H2: Coordinators select the most frequently-mentioned label more often than Seekers. 
H3: Seekers (and Pickers) select the most frequently-mentioned label more often than Hiders. 
Formally, the assumptions above imply that the “Coordinators’ probability of selecting the most 
frequently-mentioned label” (i.e., the option with the highest NGRAM) is defined by 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 =
(𝑙𝑙0 ⋅ 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻) + (𝑙𝑙1 ⋅ 1) + (𝑙𝑙2 ⋅ 1), where 𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘 denotes the share of Lk players in our subject pool while 
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 denotes the frequency with which L0 types select the option with the highest NGRAM (as 
defined by assumption i). Thus, a term in the expression above represents the probability that the 
relevant share of Lk Coordinators in our subject pool select the option with the highest NGRAM.  
(Incidentally, we stress that L0 behavior by definition is the same across roles.)  Next, the 
“Seekers’ probability of selecting the option with the highest NGRAM” is given by 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 =
(𝑙𝑙0 ⋅ 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻) + (𝑙𝑙1 ⋅ 1) + (𝑙𝑙2 ⋅ 0), where the second and third terms refer to L1 and L2 Seekers, 
respectively.  Further, the “Hiders’ probability of selecting the option with the highest NGRAM” 
is given by 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 = (𝑙𝑙0 ⋅ 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻) + (𝑙𝑙1 ⋅ 0) + (𝑙𝑙2 ⋅ 0), where the second and third terms respectively 
refer to L1 and L2 Hiders.  Now, assuming that there are strategic players in our subject pool 
(i.e., 𝑙𝑙1, 𝑙𝑙2 > 0, with 𝑙𝑙0, 𝑙𝑙1, 𝑙𝑙2 ∈ (0,1) and 𝑙𝑙0 + 𝑙𝑙1 + 𝑙𝑙2 = 1), then – under the standard assumption 
that the distribution of types is the same across roles/conditions – the above entails that  
𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 > 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 > 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆  and  𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ≥ 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 ≥ 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆, where 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 denotes the “Pickers’ 
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probability of selecting the option with the highest NGRAM”, with 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 ≡ 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 as per 
assumption (i).21  Conversely, the above implies that the likelihood of choosing the option with 
the lowest NGRAM will possibly rise when moving from Coordinate (or Pick) to Seek to Hide. 
 
Results. Table 2 presents mean choices in each of the four roles/conditions, given a classification 
of the strategy-labels based on their relative n-gram frequency, as per Table 1 above.  (For a bar 
graph of the distributions of individual-level choices in each of the games and conditions, see 
Appendix A.)  By taking a glance at Table 2, the reader will notice that the mean distribution of 
choices varies with each condition.  In fact, the most frequently-mentioned label (i.e., the option 
with the highest NGRAM) was chosen less and less often when moving from Coordinate (or 
Pick) to Seek to Hide.  Consequently, the least frequently-mentioned label (i.e., the option with 
the lowest NGRAM) was chosen more and more often when moving from Coordinate (5.71%) to 
Pick (13.33%) to Seek (22.27%) to Hide (30.29%).  Taken together, these patterns seem to 
confirm that subjects used word frequency in a (boundedly) rational manner, whereby the higher 
the word frequency of a label, the lower the likelihood of choosing that option when moving 
from Coordinate to Hide.  Put differently, the lower the word frequency of a label, the higher the 
likelihood of choosing that option when moving from Coordinate to Hide.  In what follows we 
further examine these trends. 
We begin by reporting a Kruskal-Wallis test, which confirms significant differences in 
the choice of the option with the highest NGRAM across conditions (N = 160 obs., 𝜒𝜒32 = 10.477, 
p = 0.014, two-tailed; note that in order to satisfy the assumption of independence of 
observations, all our non-parametric tests are conducted on the sample of per-subject mean 
choices, as described in footnote 15, p. 11).  Similarly, the same test confirms significant 
differences in the choice of the option with the lowest NGRAM across conditions (N = 160 obs., 
𝜒𝜒32 = 34.353, p = 0.000, two-tailed).22,23 
 
21 The weak inequalities are due to the fact that the modeler has no a-priori knowledge of 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻, with 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ∈ [0,1]. On a 
different note, we stress that since our focus is on behavioral comparisons across roles (as opposed to identifying the 
empirical distribution of levels), we need not make any further assumptions in order to generate our hypotheses. 
22 Also, Hotelling’s T-squared generalized means tests (conducted on the samples of per-subject mean choices) 
reveal that the distribution of choices in each of the Coordinate, Pick, and Seek conditions differs from the fully 
mixed equilibrium assigning equal probability to all strategies  (for Coordinate: N = 42 obs., 𝑇𝑇2 = 389.71, p = 0.000;  
for Pick: N = 39 obs., 𝑇𝑇2 = 55.72, p = 0.000;  for Seek: N = 44 obs., 𝑇𝑇2 = 20.66, p = 0.000).  However, the same test 
shows that the distribution of choices in the Hide condition does not differ from the fully mixed equilibrium, a fact 
that might be interpreted as indirect evidence in support of H3 (we shall test that hypothesis below). 
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 Coordinate Pick Seek Hide 
Choice by word 
frequency 
    
Strategy-label with 
highest NGRAM    
metric is chosen [𝑓𝑓𝐻𝐻], % 
46.19 
(.1464) 
 
48.46 
(.1646) 
 
43.64 
(.1556) 
 
36.86 
(.1548) 
 
Strategy-label with 
middling NGRAM 
metric is chosen [𝑓𝑓𝑀𝑀], % 
48.10 
(.1596) 
38.21 
(.1211) 
34.09 
(.1661) 
32.85 
(.1202) 
Strategy-label with 
lowest NGRAM     
metric is chosen [𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿], % 
5.71 
(.0914) 
13.33 
(.1675) 
22.27 
(.2044) 
30.29 
(.2121) 
Total, % 100 100 100 100 
Total # triplets (1,600) 420 390 440 350 
Subjects (160) 42 39 44 35 
Table 2 - (Per-subject) mean choices, given a classification of the labels based on their relative n-gram 
frequency; in parentheses is the standard deviation. Note: the number of triplets is obtained by 
multiplying the number of tasks/games (i.e., 10) by the number of participants in each role/condition. 
 
In order to address our hypotheses, later on we report a formal econometric analysis that 
accounts for the characteristics of each triplet of labels, such as the position of the labels on the 
screen (i.e., top, center, or bottom of the list) and their numerical NGRAM values.  Before doing 
so – to sketch a rough outline of the main patterns emerging from our dataset – we shall present 
some non-parametric tests conducted on the sample of per-subject mean observations (i.e., the 
tests use one observation per participant).  We start by comparing behavior in the Coordinate and 
Pick conditions: a one-tailed test allows us to check the “alternative hypothesis” that the most 
frequently-mentioned label (i.e., the option with the highest NGRAM) is selected strictly less 
often in Coordinate than in Pick.24  In short, a one-tailed Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test shows no 
evidence of a significant decrease in the choice of the most frequently-mentioned label when 
 
23 Incidentally, we note that the expected coordination rate resulting from our sample is 0.44 (for subjects in a 
Coordinator role). This implies that, on average, the payoff to our Coordinators is 33% higher than the payoff 
subjects would obtain by playing the fully mixed equilibrium.  In the case of the Hide-and-Seek game, the average 
payoff to subjects in a Seeker role is about 2% higher than the payoff that would be obtained by a hypothetical 
Seeker who randomizes uniformly over labels; then, the average payoff to subjects in a Hider role is about 1% lower 
than the payoff that would be obtained by a hypothetical Hider who randomizes uniformly over labels. 
24 Note that H1 says that Coordinators select the most frequently-mentioned label as often as (or more often than) 
Pickers.  Because of the weak inequality, here we shall test against the alternative hypothesis that the most 
frequently-mentioned label is selected strictly less often in Coordinate than in Pick. 
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moving from Pick to Coordinate (N = 81 obs., Z = -1.008, p = 0.1567).  Conversely, a one-tailed 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test provides evidence of a significant decrease in the choice of the 
least frequently-mentioned label when moving from Pick to Coordinate (N = 81 obs., Z = -2.726, 
p = 0.003).  These tests provide some very preliminary evidence in support of H1. 
A similar analysis shows no significant difference between the Coordinate and Seek 
conditions, with respect to the choice of the most frequently-mentioned label.  Yet, a one-tailed 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test provides evidence of a significant increase in the choice of the 
least frequently-mentioned label when moving from Coordinate to Seek (N = 86 obs., Z = -4.235, 
p = 0.000).  The latter result might be viewed as indirect evidence in support of H2, which 
warrants further testing: later on, the econometric analysis will shed light on these data patterns. 
Non-parametric tests additionally show that the most frequently-mentioned label was 
selected more often in Pick than in Hide, providing some preliminary support for H3 (N = 74 
obs., Z = 3.101, p = 0.000, one-tailed Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test).  Similarly, the most 
frequently-mentioned label was selected significantly more often in Seek than in Hide (N = 79 
obs., Z = 1.978, p = 0.023, one-tailed Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test), which again supports H3.  
(Unsurprisingly, the same test shows that the least frequently-mentioned label was selected 
significantly more often in Hide than in Pick, and significantly more often in Hide than in Seek.) 
In summary, our non-parametric tests confirm a trend where the higher the word 
frequency of a label, the lower the likelihood of choosing that option when moving from 
Coordinate (or Pick) to Hide.  Put differently, there is a trend where the lower the word 
frequency of a label, the higher the likelihood of choosing that option when moving from 
Coordinate to Pick to Seek to Hide.  That being said, we note that since the above tests are 
conducted on the sample of (per-subject) mean choices, they do not account for differences in 
individual responses across tasks/games, or for differences in the numerical NGRAM values; 
also, those tests do not control for the labels’ position on the screen. 
For the reasons above, we shall now corroborate our analysis by reporting the results of 
alternative-specific conditional logit models (“asclogit”; i.e., McFadden’s choice model, 1973).  
These models will provide the ultimate test of our hypotheses, controlling for the characteristics 
of each game (i.e., triplet of labels) to which each subject was exposed.  Below we report the 
main findings while we refer the reader to Appendix A for the full econometric tables. 
Overall, the models confirm a significant positive effect of word frequency on choice 
behavior, across treatments.  In particular, the higher the n-gram frequency of a label, the more 
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likely it is for that strategy option to be selected (regardless of the label’s position on the screen).  
Moreover, when comparing behavior in Coordinate and Pick, the model indicates no significant 
difference in the relative impact of word frequency between these conditions (see variable WFC 
in model [1] of Table 1A, in Appendix A).  This implies that there is no difference in the 
probability of choosing the most frequently-mentioned label between Coordinate and Pick, 
which confirms the previous evidence in regards to H1. 
Next, when contrasting behavior in Coordinate against Seek, we find a significant 
difference in the relative impact of word frequency on choice, controlling for the labels’ position 
on the screen. That is, a label with a higher NGRAM value is more likely to drive the choices of 
Coordinators than Seekers (coef. = -.119, z = -2.44, p = 0.015, two-tailed asclogit conducted on 
the sample of individual observations, with standard errors adjusted for clustering on 86 subjects; 
see variable WFC in model [2] of Table 1A). The result evidently supports H2. 
Also, contrasting behavior in Pick against Hide, we find a significant difference in the 
relative impact of word frequency on choice (controlling for the labels’ position on the screen); 
that is, a label with a higher NGRAM value is more likely to drive the choices of Pickers than 
Hiders (coef. = -.201, z = -3.77, p = 0.000, two-tailed asclogit conducted on the sample of 
individual observations, with standard errors clustered on 74 subjects; see variable WFC in 
model [3] of Table 2A).  Finally, when contrasting behavior in Seek against Hide, we find again 
a significant difference in the relative impact of word frequency on choice (controlling for the 
labels’ position on the screen): a label with a higher NGRAM value is more likely to drive the 
choices of Seekers than Hiders (coef. = -.2145, z = -2.14, p = 0.033, two-tailed asclogit 
conducted on the sample of individual observations, with standard errors clustered on 79 
subjects; see variable WFC in model [4] of Table 2A). The results support H3. 
To conclude, the data provide strong support for our hypotheses (please refer to 
Appendix A for an extended commentary on the econometric analysis). Despite the fact that our 
conditions involve the same option triplets, more frequently-mentioned labels were selected less 
often when moving from Coordinate to Seek, from Pick to Hide, and from Seek to Hide.  These 
data patterns confirm that individuals select strategies that fulfill our characterization of 
prominence, and they do so in a (boundedly) rational manner consistent with our level-k 
specification. In the remainder of the article we shall delve into the strategic use of labels in pure 
coordination games. 
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V - Study 3 
Demographics. The subject pool for Study 3 consisted of 80 individuals, of which half were US 
residents and half were UK residents. Participants were recruited through the Prolific Academic 
platform, at the same time. In the US-residents sample, the average participant was 29 years old, 
and 75% of the subjects were male. In the UK-residents sample, the average participant was 31 
years old, and 63% of the subjects were male. As with our previous studies, participants took less 
than 10 minutes to review the instructions and complete all the tasks; they received a 0.5 GBP 
participation fee, in addition to the payoffs earned in each game, as specified below. 
 
Design. In what follows we describe a set of treatments that are intended to further illuminate the 
strategic use of labels in coordination games.  The present study involves exactly the same pure 
coordination structure as in Study 1 (see Figure 1 above), except that this time our games feature 
different labels than before.  Unlike our previous studies – which featured randomly generated 
labels – in this case we purposely selected triplets of labels so that the option with the highest 
word frequency differs between the American- and British-English vocabularies (as measured by 
the relevant NGRAM in the American- and British-English Google Books corpora). 
Specifically, subjects played 10 instances of the coordination game in Figure 1, with each 
instance differing from the others only in the names of the three options (displayed below). Each 
subject was assigned the same partner for all the (10) games, and was so informed. No feedback 
was provided between games. The order of the games was randomized across subjects. Instead, 
the order of the three options – in a given game – was determined prior to the experiment at 
random, and was identical across subjects. That is, in each game the strategy-labels were 
arranged in a column, with options X, Y, and Z of Table 3 being respectively displayed at the 
top, center, and bottom of the list.  For the experimental instructions and screenshots, see 
Appendix B. 
As we previously noted, a key feature of this experiment is that we varied the cultural 
makeup of the subject pool (by recruiting samples of US residents and of UK residents).  
Additionally, we manipulated the subjects’ perception of their counterpart’s cultural/linguistic 
background: we did so by providing subjects with different information as to their partner’s 
country of residence. More precisely, each participant – whether in the US or in the UK sample – 
was assigned to one of the following “information conditions”. 
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a. NO-Info: Participants in this condition received no information about their partner’s 
country of residence (hence, this condition is identical to Study 1, except that we used 
different strategy-labels). The instructions in this condition stated: “Please choose one 
option. Each of you and your partner receive £0.10 if you both choose the same option, 
£0 otherwise”. 
b. Know-UK  (“k-UK”): Participants in this condition were told that their partner resided in 
the UK. Specifically, subjects were shown the following message: “Please choose one 
option. Each of you and your partner receive £0.10 if you both choose the same option, 
£0 otherwise. Your partner is a Prolific worker who resides in the UK. Your partner may 
or may not know where you reside”. 
c. Know-US  (“k-US”): Participants in this condition were told that their partner resided in 
the US. Specifically, subjects were shown the following message: “Please choose one 
option. Each of you and your partner receive £0.10 if you both choose the same option, 
£0 otherwise. Your partner is a Prolific worker who resides in the US. Your partner may 
or may not know where you reside”. 25 
In summary, we recruited samples of US and UK residents; each subject was then randomly 
assigned to one of the three information conditions, irrespective of the subject’s own residence. 
We stress that if the effect of word frequency in coordination games were due to an 
automatic (or naïve) response, then we should observe similar choice distributions across 
conditions and countries.  If however subjects used word frequency in a strategic manner, then 
we should find that options with higher NGRAM values (in the subjects’ respective 
vocabularies) are more often selected when subjects think that their partner is culturally alike.  In 
that case, subjects would realize that culturally alike people may view the problem similarly. 
That is, if a label comes to mind easily to a subject, then she will realize that it may also come to 
mind easily to others with the same vocabulary. This leads to the following hypotheses. 
H4: Choice behavior differs between US and UK residents, and it is positively related to the 
labels’ n-gram frequency in the vocabulary of the respective countries. 
H5: Subjects who are informed that their partner resides in the same country select the most 
frequently-mentioned label (in their vocabulary) more often than subjects who are unaware of 
their partner’s residence. In turn, the latter select the most frequently-mentioned label more 
often than subjects who are informed that their partner resides in a different country. 
 
25 The reason we tell subjects that their partner may or may not know where they reside is the following. For the 
purpose of calculating coordination rates via Monte Carlo methods, such a wording permits us to virtually match 
each subject with any participants in the relevant country (regardless of those participants’ information condition). 
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 [option X] [option Y] [option Z]   [option X] [option Y] [option Z] 
1 paprika curry chili  6 sardines tuna cod 
US .5718 .3859 .6963 (h)  US .4648 .6225 (h) .4439 
UK .4281 .6140 (h) .3036  UK .5351 .3774 .5560 (h) 
2 Bordeaux Chianti Syrah  7 cheesecake scones tiramisu 
US .4784 .6574 (h) .5222  US .6852 (h) .4438 .5849 
UK .5215 (h) .3425 .4777  UK .3147 .5561 (h) .4150 
3 venison lamb pork  8 burrito panini kebab 
US .5240 .4543 .5816 (h)  US .7599 (h) .3145 .3579 
UK .4759 .5456 (h) .4183  UK .2400 .6854 (h) .6420 
4 peach pineapple pear  9 parsnip beetroot shallot 
US .5110 .5731 (h) .4359  US .5492 .2788 .7001 (h) 
UK .4889 .4268 .5640 (h)  UK .4507 .7211 (h) .2998 
5 blueberry blackberry gooseberry  10 oatmeal porridge granola 
US .6741 (h) .4838 .2700  US .5838 .3529 .8263 (h) 
UK .3258 .5161 .7299 (h)  UK .4161 .6470 (h) .1736 
Table 3 - The option sets for Study 3. The first and second row below the strategy-labels respectively 
report the American-English and British-English relative n-gram frequency of the corresponding word, 
for books published after the year 2000.  For visual clarity, the option with the relatively highest NGRAM 
value is marked with an “h”.26 
 
We note that the hypotheses above are consistent with a level-k specification allowing for 
multiple (alternative) L0 types, whereby the modal choice of each L0 type corresponds to the 
option with the highest NGRAM value in that type’s vocabulary. Given this, players at L1 best 
respond to a convex combination of their beliefs about each L0 type; as usual, players at L2 then 
best respond to (their beliefs about) L1 behavior, and so on. 
 
Results. Table 4 presents mean choices, given a classification of the strategy-labels based on 
their n-gram frequency as follows.  The left panel provides summary data by pooling all the 
 
26 For any given label, the number reported in the first row (“US”) below the label is obtained by performing the 
following operations: (i) divide the American-English NGRAM value of the label by the sum of the values of the 
three labels in the game; (ii) perform the same operation as before, except this time use British-English NGRAM 
values; (iii) divide the outcome of (i) by the sum of the outcomes of (i) and (ii).  The rationale behind step (iii) is to 
ensure that our measure of word frequency is a function of both vocabularies and hence applies to all the subjects, 
regardless of their information condition.  Finally, note that – for each label – the numbers reported in the first and 
second row immediately below the label add up to 1. 
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choices, across our two country samples and three information conditions.  Specifically, note that 
the left panel classifies strategy options based on the subjects’ vocabularies (i.e., American- and 
British-English respectively for US and UK participants, as shown in Table 3), regardless of their 
information condition.  Thus, the table gives us an idea of the overall impact of word frequency: 
as can be seen in the left panel, a plurality of the choices (41.25%) consist of the option with the 
highest NGRAM value in the responding subject’s vocabulary.  A Hotelling’s T-squared 
generalized means test (conducted on the sample of per-subject mean choices) confirms that the 
distribution of choices differs from the fully mixed equilibrium assigning equal probability to all 
the strategies (N = 80 obs., 𝑇𝑇2 = 15.14, p = 0.001).  Moreover, a two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-
rank test indicates that the frequency of choice of the option with the highest NGRAM value is 
significantly different from chance (N = 80 obs., z = 3.467, p = 0.000). 
For the purpose of comparing choice distributions between countries, the right panel of 
Table 4 classifies strategy options based on the labels’ word frequency in the American-English 
vocabulary only.  By taking a look at the right panel (Table 4), the reader will notice that the 
distribution of choices varies by country.  In particular, the higher the n-gram frequency of a 
label in the American-English vocabulary, the more likely it is for the associated option to be 
selected by participants in the US rather than in the UK (remarkably, the option with the highest 
American-English NGRAM was chosen 47.25% and 38.75% of the time by US and UK 
residents, respectively).  A two-group Hotelling’s T-squared generalized means test (conducted 
on the samples of per-subject mean choices) confirms that the US and UK choice distributions 
differ from each other (N = 80 obs., 𝑇𝑇2 = 11.665, p = 0.004).  (The econometric analysis below 
will delve into the British-English vocabulary as well.) 
To sum up, the above provides evidence in support of H4: behavior differs between US 
and UK residents, and overall is positively related to the labels’ n-gram frequency in the 
vocabulary of the respective countries.  (For a more granular breakdown of the data with respect 
to both the American- and British-English vocabularies, see Table 3A in Appendix A.)  That 
said, we note that since the above tests are conducted on the sample of mean choices, they do not 
account for differences in individual responses across games; also, the above tests do not control 
for differences in the labels’ position on the screen or their numerical NGRAM values.  For these 
reasons, later on we will corroborate our findings by discussing some robustness checks. 
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 Pooled country samples  US residents 
UK 
residents 
 Labels’ word frequency refers 
to the relevant vocabulary 
(i.e., American- and British-
English for US and UK 
residents, respectively) 
 
Labels’ word frequency refers 
to the American-English 
vocabulary 
Choice by word 
frequency 
    
Strategy-label with 
highest NGRAM    
metric is chosen [𝑓𝑓𝐻𝐻], % 
41.25 
(.1951)  
47.25 
(.1986) 
38.75 
(.1785) 
Strategy-label with 
middling NGRAM 
metric is chosen [𝑓𝑓𝑀𝑀], % 
28.13 
(.1599)  
30.25 
(.1656) 
26.00 
(.1532) 
Strategy-label with 
lowest NGRAM     
metric is chosen [𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿], % 
30.62 
(.1871)  
22.50 
(.1597) 
35.25 
(.1739) 
Total, % 100  100 100 
Total # triplets 800  400 400 
Subjects 80  40 40 
Table 4 - (Per-subject) mean choices, given a classification of the labels based on their n-gram frequency; 
in parentheses is the standard deviation. Note: the number of triplets equals the number of games (i.e., 10) 
times the number of participants in each condition.  The left panel presents summary data by pooling 
choices from the US and UK samples (in each country sample, strategy options are ranked by word 
frequency in the respective vocabulary).  For the sole purpose of comparing distributions across samples, 
the right panel breaks down the data by country, given a classification of the labels based on the 
American-English corpus. 
 
We move on to address H5, which concerns differences across information conditions (as 
opposed to differences across country samples).  To that end, Table 5 below divides the data into 
three mutually exclusive groups.  The first group (“know-SAME”) consists of participants who 
were informed that their assigned partner resided in the same country (i.e., US participants in the 
know-US condition, and UK participants in the know-UK condition).  The second group consists 
of subjects who were not informed about their partner’s residence, and corresponds to all the 
participants in the No-info condition.  The third group (“know-OTHER”) consists of participants 
who were informed that their assigned partner resided in a different country (i.e., US participants 
in the know-UK condition, and UK participants in the know-US condition). 
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 Know-SAME NO-Info Know-OTHER 
Choice by word 
frequency 
   
Strategy-label with     
highest NGRAM          
metric is chosen [𝑓𝑓𝐻𝐻], % 
50.00 
(.1809) 
41.62 
(.1818) 
30.50 
(.1904) 
Strategy-label with   
middling NGRAM       
metric is chosen [𝑓𝑓𝐻𝐻], % 
29.13 
(.1621) 
27.29 
(.1627) 
28.50 
(.1598) 
Strategy-label with       
lowest NGRAM           
metric is chosen [𝑓𝑓𝐻𝐻], % 
20.87 
(.1311) 
31.09 
(.1882) 
41.00 
(.1889) 
Total, % 100 100 100 
Total # triplets 230 370 200 
Subjects 23 37 20 
Table 5 - (Per-subject) mean choices, given a classification of the labels based on the relevant n-gram 
frequency (i.e., with respect to the American- and British-English vocabularies for US and UK residents, 
respectively, regardless of their information condition).  In parentheses is the standard deviation.  Note: 
“Know-SAME” includes US residents in the know-US condition, and UK residents in the know-UK 
condition.  Participants in “NO-Info” received no information about the partner’s country of residence.  
“Know-OTHER” includes US residents in the know-UK condition, and UK residents in the know-US 
condition. 
 
As can be seen in Table 5 above, the mean distribution of choices varies with each group. 
A quick glance reveals that the most frequently-mentioned label (i.e., the option with the highest 
NGRAM in the responding subject’s vocabulary) was chosen less and less often when moving 
from know-SAME (50.00%) to No-info (41.62%) to know-OTHER (30.50%).  A Kruskal-Wallis 
test (conducted on the sample of per-subject mean choices) confirms significant differences in 
the choice of the option with the highest NGRAM across groups (N = 80 obs., 𝜒𝜒22 = 10.597, p = 
0.005, two-tailed).  Further, Table 5 reveals that the least frequently-mentioned label (i.e., the 
option with the lowest NGRAM) was chosen more and more often, moving from know-SAME 
(20.87%) to No-info (31.09%) to know-OTHER (41.00%), with such differences being again 
significant (N = 80 obs., 𝜒𝜒22 = 12.032, p = 0.002, two-tailed Kruskal-Wallis test).27  The above 
provides some preliminary evidence in support of H5. 
 
27 Also, the distribution of choices in each of the know-SAME and No-info groups differs from the fully mixed 
equilibrium assigning equal probability to all the strategies, as is confirmed by Hotelling’s T-squared generalized 
means tests conducted on the samples of mean choices (for know-SAME: N = 23 obs., 𝑇𝑇2 = 26.91, p = 0.000;  for 
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The tests presented so far provide some insights into the behavioral patterns that emerge 
from a dataset consisting of average choices (i.e., to satisfy the assumption of independence of 
observations, the tests above are conducted on the sample of per-subject mean choices, as 
described in footnote 15, p. 11).  In order to account for any differences in choice behavior 
across games, we proceed to corroborate our findings by conducting an econometric analysis of 
the full sample of individual observations (while adjusting standard errors for clustering on the 
subjects).  We start by investigating the relationship between one’s use of word frequency and 
one’s knowledge of the counterpart’s country of residence.  To that end, we coded a 
“knowledge” ordinal variable as follows: this variable takes on value 1 if a subject is in the 
know-OTHER group (i.e., a subject knows that the partner resides in a different country); it takes 
on value 2 if a subject is in the NO-info condition (i.e., a subject receives no information about 
the partner’s country of residence); it takes on value 3 if a subject is in the know-SAME group 
(i.e., a subject knows that the partner resides in the same country).  We then coded a binary 
“NGRAM prediction” variable, which takes on value 1 if a subject selects the option with the 
highest NGRAM value in her own vocabulary, and takes on value 0 otherwise.  A logit model 
consisting of the “NGRAM prediction” as the binary dependent variable (and of the 
“knowledge” variable as the sole predictor) confirms a significant positive effect of the 
knowledge variable on the choice of the option with the highest NGRAM (for the US sample, 
coef. = .4529, z = 2.65, p = 0.008, two-tailed logit with standard errors clustered on 40 subjects;  
for the UK sample, coef. = .3851, z = 2.44, p = 0.015, two-tailed logit with standard errors 
clustered on 40 subjects).  The above confirms that – in each of our two country samples – 
subjects used word frequency in a strategic manner. The more they had reason to believe that 
their partner was alike, the more likely they were to select the most frequently-mentioned label in 
their respective vocabularies. So, the results strengthen our previous evidence in support of H5. 
We turn to the next robustness checks. (We shall report the main findings here, while we 
refer the reader to Appendix A for the econometric tables and further commentary.)  In order to 
control for differences in the labels’ position or differences in their numerical NGRAM values, 
we ran alternative-specific conditional logit models (“asclogit”; McFadden’s choice model, 
1973).  Overall, the models confirm a significant positive effect of word frequency on choice 
 
No-info: N = 37 obs., 𝑇𝑇2 = 9.21, p = 0.018).  However, we find no such difference in know-OTHER (N = 20 obs., 𝑇𝑇2 
= 3.73, p = 0.199).  The latter suggests that subjects picked an option at random only if they did not have a 
compelling reason to rely on the labels’ word frequency in their own vocabularies. 
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behavior.  In particular, the higher the n-gram frequency of a label in the country’s relevant 
vocabulary, the more likely it is for that option to be selected (regardless of the label’s position 
on the screen).  Moreover, when comparing choice behavior in the know-SAME and know-
OTHER groups, the models reveal significant differences in the relative impact of word 
frequency; that is, if one is informed that the partner resides in a different country, then one is 
less likely to select the option with the highest NGRAM in one’s vocabulary (see models [5]-[6] 
of Table 4A, in Appendix A). 
We conclude this section by discussing coordination rates. For this purpose, we compared 
the (expected) coordination rates that would be obtained if participants in different subsamples 
were paired with each other, using Monte Carlo methods (see footnote 17, p. 11).  In short, 
whereas picking at random implies a coordination rate of 0.33, our subjects’ choice behavior 
implies an expected coordination rate of 0.55 and 0.43 respectively for US and UK participants 
knowingly paired with their compatriots.  Notably, these rates drop to 0.47 (0.39) in the case of 
US (UK) participants unknowingly paired with their compatriots.  We finally considered the case 
in which US and UK participants were knowingly and unknowingly paired with each other, and 
found that the expected coordination rates were respectively 0.37 and 0.38.  In summary, our 
results show that successful coordination is more likely when subjects are knowingly paired with 
partners from their own country, as opposed to when they are knowingly or unknowingly paired 
with partners from a different country. 
 
VI - Conclusion 
We have presented a set of studies that test whether the frequency with which labels are 
mentioned in everyday language may affect game play.  In the first study, we found that the 
labels’ frequency of occurrence in the vocabulary of the subject (quantified by the Google Books 
n-gram frequency) is a good predictor of choice behavior in coordination games.  Our second 
study verifies if subjects utilize word frequency strategically rather than naïvely. To do so, we 
contrasted participants in coordination games with participants in three alternative roles, namely, 
“Pickers”, “Hiders”, and “Seekers”. The data reveal that Pickers are as likely as Coordinators to 
select the most frequently-mentioned label; instead, Hiders are less likely than Seekers and, in 
turn, Seekers are less likely than Coordinators. This pattern suggests a (boundedly) rational use 
of frequently-mentioned labels.  Our third study delves into the strategic use of word frequency 
in coordination games, by contrasting culturally diverse participants. To that end, we recruited 
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samples of US and UK participants, and then varied their knowledge of the counterpart’s country 
of residence. Consistent with our predictions, we found that behavior differs across US and UK 
residents, and it is positively related to the labels’ n-gram frequency in the subject’s own 
vocabulary. Further, a subject is less likely to rely on word frequency as a means to guiding her 
behavior if she knows that the counterpart resides in a different country. 
Our approach was inspired by previous evidence on the use of word frequency as a cue in 
non-strategic tasks (e.g., Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002; Dougherty et al., 2008).  Here, we 
have shown that word frequency has a role in strategic reasoning too.  Remarkably, our results 
imply that subjects are consciously aware as to how labels might be perceived by culturally alike 
counterparts, and accordingly adjust their strategies.  In this regard, our results are related to a 
stream of research suggesting that individuals are aware of the communication difficulties that 
arise when groups with different “conversational codes” merge with each other (Weber and 
Camerer, 2003; Feiler and Camerer, 2010).  It is also worth noting a connection with rational 
speech act theory, which formalizes how participants in conversational interactions make 
inferences about the meaning of utterances so as to achieve “coordination of meaning”, based on 
their knowledge of the counterpart and context (Goodman and Frank, 2016). 
Before concluding, we note that the past decade has seen the growth of large-scale online 
datasets and, with it, unique opportunities to investigate human behavior and its cultural 
correlates.  In particular, the Google Books corpus has been used to analyze trends in stereotypes 
and wellbeing across cultures (e.g., Garg et al., 2018; Hills et al., 2019). More generally, internet 
data on human activity have been used in fields as diverse as public health (Hawn, 2009), 
cognitive science (Griffiths, 2015), and management (George, Osinga, Lavie, and Scott, 2016).  
Our paper shows that such data may inform theories of strategic reasoning as well.  Relatedly, 
we note that although this paper has focused on strategic problems with incentives to and not to 
coordinate, our characterization of prominence may have wider application; in fact, subjects’ 
exposure to alternative labels – ceteris paribus – can inform behavioral predictions in any class 
of games with strategic uncertainty. 
To conclude, this paper has proposed and tested an a-priori measurable proxy for 
prominence that explicitly rests on players’ culture. The results provide very robust evidence in 
support of our characterization of prominence. In doing so, the results contribute to shedding 
light on the relationship between culture, (bounded) rationality and coordination, which plays an 
important role in several interactions among economic agents.  
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APPENDIX A 
Additional figures and tables 
 
 
Study 1 
 
Figure 1A - Frequency distributions of individual-level choices in each of the 1-10 games in Version A 
(left panel) and Version B (right panel).  For visual clarity, in each of the bars, the options have been 
arranged according to their NGRAM values: darker shades of gray represent options with relatively 
higher NGRAM values.  For the list of labels in each of the games, see Table 1 in the body of the paper. 
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Study 2 
 
Figure 2A - Frequency distributions of individual-level choices in each of the 1-10 games and for each of 
the 1-4 conditions.  Conditions 1-4 refer to “Coordinate”, “Pick”, “Seek”, and “Hide”, respectively.  For 
visual clarity, in each of the bars, the options have been arranged according to their NGRAM values (i.e., 
darker shades of gray represent options with relatively higher NGRAM values).  For the list of labels in 
each of the 1-10 games, see the left panel of Table 1 in the body of the paper. 
 
 
We now present a set of alternative-specific conditional logit models (“asclogit”; 
McFadden’s choice model, 1973).  Before describing the list of predictors, note that asclogit 
analysis differs from other logistic models in that it accounts for “alternative-specific” variables, 
as well as “case-specific” variables, as defined below. 
Alternative-specific variables represent attributes that may vary across each of the options 
in a choice task (e.g., the labels’ numerical NGRAM value varies across the three options). If an 
alternative-specific predictor has a positive coefficient, then it implies that the alternative 
featuring a higher value is more likely selected than the other alternatives, whichever they are.  
Relatedly, note that alternative-specific predictors do not have an explicit base category; for 
further discussion, see Cameron and Trivedi (2010, pp. 503-511). 
Case-specific variables, on the other hand, represent attributes that are common to each 
of the three options in a given choice task (e.g., the experimental condition).  Coefficients of 
case-specific predictors are interpreted as parameters of an ordinary multinomial logit model 
against the base category.  Note that the following tables present an upper section, which lists 
alternative-specific predictors, and a lower bifurcated section that lists case-specific predictors. 
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In particular, our models consist of the following predictors: i. a continuous variable 
“WF” representing the word frequency of a label (quantified by the NGRAM values in Table 1 
in the body of the paper); ii. a dummy variable “C” indicating the experimental condition to 
which a triplet belongs, as specified in the table notes below; iii. an interaction variable “WFC” 
(which captures how the impact of a change in a label’s NGRAM varies with the experimental 
condition). 
 
 
[1] 
Pick & Coordinate 
 
[2] 
Coordinate & Seek 
Choice of option      
Relative word frequency 
(“WF”) 
.637*** 
(.161) 
 
.707*** 
(.111) 
      
Relative word frequency * Condition 
(“WFC”) 
-.050 
(.104) 
 
-.119** 
(.049) 
      
 Center 
label 
Bottom 
label 
 
Center 
label 
Bottom 
label 
      
Condition 
(“C”) 
-.948*** 
(.212) 
-.853*** 
(.212) 
 
1.157*** 
(.227) 
.896*** 
(.214) 
      
Constant -.357*** 
(.115) 
-.098 
(.110) 
 
-1.305*** 
(.177) 
-.951*** 
(.181) 
      
Log pseudolikelihood -746.093  -824.402 
Obs. 810  860 
Table 1A - Alternative-specific conditional logit model coefficients; in parentheses are standard errors 
clustered on the subjects (*, **, and *** indicate 𝑝𝑝 < 0.10, 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05 and 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01, respectively, for the 
relevant Z Statistic, two-tailed tests). 
Model [1]: C takes on value 0 if a subject is assigned to Pick, and value 1 if assigned to Coordinate. 
Model [2]: C takes on value 0 if a subject is assigned to Coordinate, and value 1 if assigned to Seek. 
 
 
 
We begin by discussing model [1] – in the left panel of Table 1A – which uses the full set 
of option triplets (i.e., ten games per subject) from the Pick and Coordinate conditions, with 
standard errors clustered on the subjects.  First of all, WF confirms a significant positive impact 
of word frequency on choice behavior. This means that the higher the NGRAM value of a label, 
the more likely it is for that option to be selected, regardless of other attributes such as the 
experimental condition or the labels’ position (i.e., top, center, or bottom of the list).  We further 
note that WFC is non-significant in model [1]. This means that there is no difference in the 
relative impact of word frequency between Pickers and Coordinators. 
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A few more comments are in order.  The coefficients for dummy C (i.e., -.948 and -.853) 
of model [1] capture the impact of a change in experimental conditions on the attractiveness of 
the center and bottom options (against the top option): they are both negative, indicating that 
center and bottom options are selected less often by Coordinators than Pickers.  Finally, the two 
constant terms (i.e., -.357 and -.098) of model [1] respectively capture the attractiveness of the 
center and bottom options (against the top option), due to unmeasured attributes of the 
alternatives. Both terms are negative (although one is non-significant), reflecting the greater 
attractiveness of the options located at the top of the list. 
Next, model [2] – in the right panel of Table 1A – uses the full set of triplets from the 
Coordinate and Seek conditions.  Model [3] in Table 2A below (left panel) uses the full set of 
triplets from the Pick and Hide conditions, whereas model [4] (right panel) uses the full set of 
triplets from the Seek and Hide conditions.  Note that WF is positive and significant in all such 
models.  Also note that WFC is negative and significant in models [2], [3], [4]: this implies that 
the most frequently-mentioned label is selected less often when moving from Coordinate to Seek 
(model [2]), from Pick to Hide (model [3]), and from Seek to Hide (model [4]), thereby 
confirming our stated hypotheses. 
 
 
[3] 
Pick & Hide 
 
[4] 
Seek & Hide 
Choice of option      
Relative word frequency 
(“WF”) 
.940*** 
(.171) 
 
.991*** 
(.350) 
      
Relative word frequency * Condition 
(“WFC”) 
-.201*** 
(.053) 
 
-.214** 
(.100) 
      
 Center 
label 
Bottom 
label 
 
Center 
label 
Bottom 
label 
      
Condition 
(“C”) 
.535*** 
(.174) 
.169 
(.168) 
 
.325* 
(.192) 
.126 
(.172) 
      
Constant -.357*** 
(.115) 
-.098 
(.110) 
 
-.148 
(.141) 
-.054 
(.115) 
      
Log pseudolikelihood -767.819  -846.129 
Obs. 740  790 
Table 2A - Alternative-specific conditional logit model coefficients; in parentheses are standard errors 
clustered on the subjects (*, **, and *** indicate 𝑝𝑝 < 0.10, 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05 and 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01, respectively, for the 
relevant Z Statistic, two-tailed tests). 
Model [3]: C takes on value 0 if a subject is assigned to Pick, and value 1 if assigned to Hide. 
Model [4]: C takes on value 0 if a subject is assigned to Seek, and value 1 if assigned to Hide.  
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Study 3 
 
 
Figure 3A - Frequency distributions of individual-level choices for each of the 1-10 games and for each 
of the 1-3 information conditions.  Conditions 1-3 refer to “No-info”, “know-UK”, and “know-US”, 
respectively.  In each of the bars, the options have been arranged according to their NGRAM values (i.e., 
darker shades of gray represent options with relatively higher NGRAM values in the relevant vocabulary; 
that is, American- and British-English for US and UK residents, respectively).  For the list of labels in 
each of the 1-10 games, see Table 3 in the body of the paper. 
US residents 
UK residents 
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 US residents UK residents 
 NO-Info Know-UK Know-US  NO-Info Know-UK Know-US 
Choice by word 
frequency 
       
Strategy-label with 
highest NGRAM    
metric is chosen [𝑓𝑓𝐻𝐻], % 
47.89 
(.1812) 
35.00 
(.2173) 
57.27 
(.1618)  
35.00 
(.1617) 
43.33 
(.1775) 
26.00 
(.1577) 
Strategy-label with 
middling NGRAM 
metric is chosen [𝑓𝑓𝑀𝑀], % 
31.05 
(.1663) 
32.00 
(.1475) 
27.27 
(.1902)  
23.33 
(.1533) 
30.83 
(.1378) 
25.00 
(.1715) 
Strategy-label with 
lowest NGRAM     
metric is chosen [𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿], % 
21.06 
(.1559) 
33.00 
(.1828) 
15.46 
(.0934)  
41.67 
(.1617) 
25.84 
(.1443) 
49.00 
(.1663) 
Total, % 100 100 100  100 100 100 
Total # triplets 190 100 110  180 120 100 
Subjects 19 10 11  18 12 10 
Table 3A - (Per-subject) mean choices, given a classification of the labels based on the relevant n-gram 
frequency; that is, American- and British-English vocabularies for US and UK residents, respectively 
(regardless of their information condition).  In parentheses is the standard deviation.  For a description of 
the experimental conditions, see p. 21 above. 
 
 
For robustness purposes, Table 4A below presents alternative-specific conditional logit 
models (McFadden, 1973; for general commentary on asclogit analysis, see p. 30 above).  In 
short, model [5] involves US residents’ choices, whereas [6] involves UK residents’ choices.  
Each model uses observations from the know-UK and know-US conditions (as usual, standard 
errors are clustered on the subjects).  Both models consist of the following predictors: i. a 
continuous variable “WF” representing the word frequency of a label in the subject’s own 
vocabulary (quantified by the relevant NGRAM values in Table 3 in the body of the paper); ii. a 
dummy “C” taking on value 0 (1) if a subject is informed that the counterpart resides in the same 
(different) country; iii. an interaction variable “WFC”. 
A glance at Table 4A reveals that WF is positive and significant in both models: this 
means that the higher the NGRAM value of a label (in the subject’s own vocabulary), the more 
likely it is for that option to be selected.  Also, note that WFC is negative and significant in both 
models: this implies that if one is informed that the counterpart resides in a different country, one 
will less likely select the option with the highest NGRAM in one’s vocabulary. 
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[5] 
US residents 
 
[6] 
UK residents 
Choice of option      
Relative word frequency 
(“WF”) 
4.479*** 
(.747) 
 
1.841** 
(.861) 
      
Relative word frequency * Condition 
(“WFC”) 
-4.316*** 
(1.471) 
 
-4.218*** 
(1.436) 
      
 Center 
label 
Bottom 
label 
 
Center 
label 
Bottom 
label 
      
Condition 
(“C”) 
.193 
(.550) 
.478 
(.508) 
 
-.261 
(.412) 
-.750* 
(.437) 
      
Constant -.491 
(.395) 
-1.078*** 
(.316) 
 
-.233 
(.313) 
-.496 
(.329) 
      
Log pseudolikelihood -203.014  -220.462 
Obs. 210  220 
Table 4A - Alternative-specific conditional logit model coefficients; in parentheses are standard errors 
clustered on the subjects (*, **, and *** indicate 𝑝𝑝 < 0.10, 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05 and 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01, respectively, for the 
relevant Z Statistic, two-tailed tests). 
Model [5]: US sample; WF refers to the American-English vocabulary. Dummy C takes on value 0 if a 
subject is assigned to know-US, and value 1 if assigned to know-UK. 
Model [6]: UK sample; WF refers to the British-English vocabulary. Dummy C takes on value 0 if a 
subject is assigned to know-UK, and value 1 if assigned to know-US. 
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APPENDIX B 
Experimental instructions and screen shots 
 
 
Study 1 
 
 
 
Below is an example of an experimental task. 
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Study 2 
 
 
Coordinate 
Same instructions as in Study 1 above. 
 
 
Pick 
 
 
Below is an example of an experimental task in the Pick condition. 
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Hide-and-Seek 
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Below is an example of an experimental task in the Seek condition. 
 
 
Below is an example of an experimental task in the Hide condition. 
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Study 3 
 
 
 
 
 
Below is an example of an experimental task in the No-info condition. 
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Below is an example of an experimental task in the know-UK condition. 
 
 
 
Below is an example of an experimental task in the know-US condition. 
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